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1 Introduction
There are disparities of conclusions concerning the impact of environmental regulation on
economic growth. On the one hand, authors such as Ligthart and van der Ploeg (1994),
Grimaud (1999) suggest that an environmental policy reduces economic growth. On the
other hand, Porter and Van der Linde (1995), Bovenberg and Smulders (1995), Hart
(2004) among others explain that a better quality of the environment is compatible with
a higher level of growth.
Motivated by this debate, we attempt to shed some light on the mechanisms through
which environmental policies can affect growth performances. In this paper, we assume the
government’s intervention which aims at obtaining a cleaner environment by using a policy
instrument to influence the pollution emissions of firms. We show that an environmental
policy can promote growth when it acts through the channel of education. The intuition
is that a tighter policy causes an augmentation of the price of goods whose production is
polluting. In the meantime, the relative price of acquiring education becomes lower. Thus,
individuals choose to accumulate more human capital which boosts the long-run economic
growth rate. Indeed, to conduct the analysis we develop a growth model in which human
capital accumulation is the ultimate engine of growth. There are two reasons that justify
this choice of formalization. First, the importance of the role played by education for
growth and development has been recognized for more than a decade in economic theory
(see the pioneering paper of Lucas, 1988). Second, it allows us to focus in a simple way
on the implication for growth of an environmental policy.
Closely related to our analysis are the papers of van Ewijk and van Wijnbergen (1995)
and Oueslati (2002). They develop growth models with pollution externalities based
on Lucas’ setting and find that environmental policy can have positive growth effects.
However, the mechanisms through which the economic policy acts differs from our paper.
In the former setting, pollution affects negatively the production of education. Thus, a
cleaner environment allows individuals to accumulate more human capital which benefits
to economic growth. In the latter, a higher environmental tax gives incentives to firms to
augment their abatement activities which leads to a diminution of the final output net of
abatement. In turn, individuals reduce their leisure time and acquire more skills in order
to overcome the lower level of consumption.
Furthermore, in this paper, we go further and augment the basic structure of these
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analyses in two ways. First, we investigate the idea that education is a product that
not only enhances the productivity of individuals on the labour market but also affects
their level of utility. Although, this notion has been considered by some economists, it
has not been formalized in growth models. For instance, Schultz (1963) explains that
the benefits to education can be divided into three components: first, an investment
component which comes from the increase in an individual’s wealth; second, a present
consumption component such as the utility derived from attending class; and a future
consumption component coming from the fact that education improves the ability of
an individual to consume other goods in life (see e.g. footnote 3, pp. 570 in Lazear,
1977). Alstadsaeter (2004), Boonprakaikawe and Tournemaine (2006) point out that
individuals acquire education not only for its implied wages reward, but also for its induced
non-pecuniary returns for which they are willing to pay. The non-pecuniary returns to
education consist of the joy of learning new things, meeting new people, moving to a new
city or a new country and so on.
Second, we develop a model that integrates a specific research and development (R&D)
activity. That is, our framework comes within the scope of the new generation of growth
models based on R&D (e.g. Romer, 1990; Grossman and Helpman, 1991; Aghion and
Howitt, 1992). Specifically, firms that produce goods, simultaneously engage in the de-
velopment of new technologies (ideas, new pieces of knowledge) that are used to reduce
pollution emissions. This idea is in line with Carraro and Siniscalco (1994) who argue
that, following an environmental policy, big corporations tend to invest in research to
develop new technologies that are less polluting rather than to reduce their production.
It should be mentioned that in the fourth section of their paper, van Ewijk and van Wi-
jnbergen (1995) consider the possibility of a separate research process aiming at reducing
pollution. However, they assume that new technologies are improved through a learning
process similar to the educational one: the decisions to invest in the learning process are
realized by individuals rather than by firms.
In contrast with the standard R&D-based literature, in our model, the new pieces of
knowledge (i.e. the non rival or non-depletable goods according to the textbook definition,
for instance that of Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green, 1995, ch. 11 or Scotchmer, 2005,
ch. 2) are not embedded inside intermediate goods. They are directly used in production
processes and protected by patents. This can be seen as a formalization of ideas that have
been developed for years by various authors such as Arrow (1962), Scotchmer (1991),
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Dasgupta et al (1996), Gallini and Scotchmer (2003) but which have not found their way
in growth models.
In addition to greatly simplify the technical analysis, we believe that such formalization
allows us to account for the recent evolution of intellectual property law: since the mid-
eighties, one observes that pieces of knowledge are directly patented. It is now possible to
obtain patents for databases, software, business plans (see Scotchmer, 1999). Scotchmer
(2005) and Quah (1997, 2001) emphasize the distinctive properties of these goods as they
label them respectively as ‘information goods’ for the former and ‘knowledge-products’
for the latter. They argue that their properties resemble to those of knowledge. This is
because the “private” goods embedding knowledge in the case of new technologies have
an almost nonexistent marginal cost of production (CD-ROM) or even a zero one (an
on-line copy). It is therefore akin to a public good and almost consubstantial with the
idea itself. When we characterize the equilibrium, we state the problem as if the piece of
knowledge itself, the public good, were patented.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we set out the
model. In Section 3, we characterize the equilibrium and discuss its properties regarding
to environmental policy changes. We conclude in Section 4. The Appendix is gathered in
Section 5.
2 The model
We consider a model in continuous time. There are four types of goods: differentiated
consumption goods, Xj, produced by an exogenous number of sectors (j = 1, . . . , N),
each one comprising Qj identical firms (qj = 1, . . . , Qj); pollution emissions, E, which
are coming from the production of differentiated goods; human capital, H, accumulated
by individuals; and knowledge, Z, produced through research activities. A continuum
of pieces of knowledge (i.e. information goods or knowledge products) constitutes the
total stock of knowledge at every point in time t. A piece of knowledge is an indivisible,
infinitely-lived, differentiated, public good. It can be a scientific report, a database, or a
software algorithm. Technologies and preferences are described as follows.
In sector j, firm qj produces a quantity Xqjt of differentiated good j, with the tech-
nology
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Xqjt = AH
X
qjt, (1)
where A > 0 is a constant productivity parameter and HXqjt is the quantity of human
capital employed for the production of the differentiated good. Simultaneously, the firm
runs in-house R&D to produce new pieces of knowledge. We denote by Zqjt the stock of
knowledge produced by firm qj until date t. New pieces of knowledge are produced with
the technology
•
Zqjt = δH
Z
qjt (Zt)
φ , (2)
where δ > 0 is a productivity parameter, φ < 1 is a measure of the knowledge spill-
over in research, HZqjt is the amount of human capital employed to conduct research and
Zt =
PN
j=1
PQj
qj=1 Zqjt. The technology (2) is closed to the one introduced by Jones (1995).
However, it accounts for the fact that human capital is a key ingredient to make research
which is established for years in economic literature: for instance, Nelson and Phelps (1966)
explain that education facilitates adoption and implementation of new technologies. It has
been used by several authors in R&D-based models with human capital accumulation (see
Arnold, 1998; Funke and Strulik, 2000; Blackburn et al, 2000; Dalgaard and Kreiner, 2001;
Strulik, 2005). The idea is that individuals are not skillful researchers by birth. They need
to be educated. Perpetual growth of knowledge is possible despite diminishing returns in
research because human capital provides the necessary increasing efforts needed to sustain
growth.
Knowledge is used to reduce pollution caused by the production of differentiated goods.
We assume that the flow of pollution emissions of firm qj is given by
Eqjt =
¡
Xqjt
¢
(Zt)
−β , (3)
where β > 0. It should be noted that most environmental problems are stock ones. Even
though carbon dioxide emissions are retained by the atmosphere, some of these are also
seized by oceans (and forests) and trapped for long periods of time. Despite this feature,
we treat pollution as a flow for two reasons. First, one can consider that it is a reasonable
approximation if the depreciation rate of pollution stock is high (see Schou, 2002). Second,
from a technical point of view, it simplifies the analysis without altering the main insight
of the paper. As a final remark one should observe that the technology (3) is closed to
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the one used by Stokey (1998), Aghion and Howitt (1998) and Grimaud (1999) in which
Zt is a measure of the dirtiness of the technology.
In our model, once a new piece of knowledge is produced, it is directly used to reduce
pollution emissions. Such assumption must be interpreted as a short-cut. Indeed, one
could assume that once a new idea has occurred it is embedded in a physical good which
is then used to reduce pollution emissions as formalized in the standard R&D-based
literature (e.g. Romer, 1990; Grossman and Helpman, 1991; Aghion and Howitt, 1992).
In this case, we could assume that the physical good is produced using human capital.
Although this kind of formalization may appear more realistic, it would complicate the
technical analysis of the model without adding new insights: we would add another market
in the analysis but the reduction of pollution emissions would still be the outcome of
increases in the stock of knowledge.
There is a mass [0, 1] of identical individuals. There is no population growth so that
all aggregate variables can be interpreted as per capita quantities. Individuals own hu-
man capital that they allocate between working activities (production of differentiated
goods, research) and education which takes place through a human accumulation process.
Following Lucas (1988), we assume that the total stock of human capital, Ht, evolves
through time according to
•
Ht = ψHHt , (4)
where ψ > 0 is the productivity of education and HHt is the quantity of human capital
devoted to education.
Individuals derive utility from the consumption of differentiated goods, their level of
education, and a clean environment, i.e. pollution has nefarious effects on their welfare.
Preferences are represented by
U =
∞Z
0
[ln[
NX
j=1
(cjt)
α]1/α + ε ln(Ht)− ω lnEt]e−ρtdt, (5)
where 0 < α < 1, ε ≥ 0, ω > 0, cjt is the per-capita purchase of each differentiated good
j, Et ≡
PN
j=1
PQj
qj=1Eqjt is the total flow of pollution emissions and ρ is the rate of time
preferences, where 0 < ρ < ψ : the productivity of education must be large compared
with the rate of time preferences to ensure positive growth at equilibrium.
The parameter ε can be interpreted as the desire for education. If ε > 0, education
is treated as a consumption good. Individuals obtain emotional benefits through school-
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ing. This can be the pleasure to learn new things, to have new friends. This can be the
possibility to consume goods, like a concert of classical music, which require a certain
level of education to be appreciated. Or, this can be the satisfaction to obtain a degree
at university: education is a mean for people to advertise their skills. This allows them
to obtain better jobs and reach a social position in the society.12 We will see that con-
sidering education as a consumption good has an important implication for the role that
an environmental policy plays for the determination of the long-run level of growth. If
ε = 0, however, the level of education has no effect on the level of utility of individuals.
This is the basic case analyzed in growth literature.
Since the whole amount of every differentiated good is consumed, one has
cjt = Xjt, (6)
where Xjt =
PQj
qj=1Xqjt. Finally, the human capital constraint is
Ht = HXt +H
Z
t +H
H
t , (7)
where HXt =
PN
j=1
PQj
qj=1H
X
qjt and H
A
t =
PN
j=1
PQj
qj=1H
A
qjt.
3 Equilibrium
This Section tackles three objectives. The first and main one is to study the effects on
the long-run economic growth rate of an environmental policy charged on polluting firms.
To reach this goal, we assume the government’s intervention by means of a tax τ t charged
on the amount of pollution emissions.
The second objective is to characterize an equilibrium with complete markets where
knowledge is directly priced and privately funded. In contrast with the standard R&D-
based literature, we assume that new pieces of knowledge are directly protected by in-
finitely lived patents. It would be possible to assume that patents expire after a finite
period. Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995, ch. 6) analyse the consequences of such assump-
tions in a standard R&D-based model. The idea is that there is an erosion of the monopoly
1
2Lazear (1977) explains that school attendance, which is necessary to acquire skills, is a ’psychic cost’
for individuals. In the absence of any wealth augmentation effects, most individuals would not acquire any
education. He estimates that education causes disutility to individuals, i.e. it is a ‘bad’. For simplicity,
in this paper, we avoid this possibility.
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power. The authors show that the main insights of the model are still valid under this
assumption. However, it complicates the analysis because there are two stocks of knowl-
edge to consider: the one whose patents have expired and the one whose patents have
not. Assuming that patents are infinitely-lived allows us to keep the analysis simple and
focus on the key feature of the model.
As knowledge is a public good, there are difficulties of funding knowledge in a decen-
tralized economy. Two types of problems arise. The first ones are related to the possibility
of verifying which agents use knowledge; they are linked to the possibility of excluding
agents that do not pay to use knowledge; they concern the problems of information on
the marginal profitability of knowledge for an agent. These problems prevent innovators
from appropriating the entire amount of the surplus they create. It should be mentioned
that if new ideas were embedded in physical goods as in the basic R&D-based literature,
it would be easier to verify which agents are using the new technologies. As explained
in Section 2, we justify our assumption by the fact that our formalization is a short-cut
which simplifies the analysis.
A second type of problem comes from the non-convexity of technologies using knowl-
edge as a productive factor (see (2) and (3)). As in a competitive market the payment
of private factors fully exhausts revenues, firms are unable to pay for the public good
they use.3 To solve this problem of existence, either we must assume that knowledge is
publicly funded which is not realistic, or we must introduce imperfect competition. In
this paper, we characterize a dynamic general equilibrium with Cournot competition and
free entry.4 We assume that the N markets for differentiated goods, Xjt, are imperfectly
competitive. By selling their goods at a price pjt which is greater than the marginal cost
of production, firms get resources that allow them to buy knowledge. We assume that
there is free entry on each differentiated good market, i.e. profits are zero. Then, the
payment of knowledge appears as a fixed cost for each firm. The number of firms, Qjt,
3See for instance Kaizuka (1965), Sandmo (1972), Manning et al. (1985), Feehan (1989), Romer
(1990), Jones (2003) for more details on this point.
4Papers by Smulders and Van de Klundert (1995, 1997) and Peretto (1998, 1999a, 1999b) which use a
similar model to ours introduce also imperfect competition. However, they do not consider the possibity
of patenting and pricing knowledge.
In a model dealing with polluting ressources, Grimaud and Rouge (2005) use the same kind of approach
in the sense that they assume that new pieces of knowledge are directly patented. But in their paper,
research is publicly funded.
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that composes each differentiated sector j is determined by using the free entry condition.
For the sake of simplicity, we assume that Qjt is a continuous variable.
We assume that knowledge is traded using bilateral contracts between inventors and
users. To keep the analysis simple, and because it does not yield new insights for the
purpose of the paper, we assume that sellers are able to extract the whole willingnesses
to pay of all buyers, i.e. there are no problem of verification, exclusion and information.
We denote by gπqjt the profit of firm qj without payment of knowledge. The willingness
to pay of firm qj to use a piece of knowledge at date t is vqjt = ∂gπqjt/∂Zt. The price that
it pays to use a piece of knowledge from t to infinity is then Vqjt =
R∞
t vqjse
−
? s
t rududs,
where ru denotes the interest rate. The payment perceived by any firm for the sale of a
piece of knowledge, i.e. the value of a piece of knowledge, is Vt =
R∞
t vse
−
? s
t rududs, where
Vt =
PN
j=1
PQjt
qj=1 Vqjt and vs =
PN
j=1
PQjt
qj=1 vqjs. Differentiating the expression of Vt with
respect to time yields the usual condition: rt = vt/Vt + gVt, where gz denotes the growth
rate of any variable z.5
Finally, the market for human capital whose price is normalized to one (wt = 1) and
the financial market are perfectly competitive. Formally, an equilibrium is defined as
follows:
Definition 1 : An equilibrium with Cournot competition and free entry is a set of profiles
of number of firms ({Qjt}, j = 1, ..., N), of quantities of goods ({Xqjt}, {HXqjt}, {HZqjt},
{Zqjt}, qj = 1, ..., Qjt, j = 1, ..., N, {HHt }), and of prices ({vqjt}, {Vqjt}, qj = 1, ..., Qjt,
j = 1, ..., N , {pjt}, j = 1, ..., N , {rt}) such that:
- individuals maximize utility;
- firms maximize profits;
- the human capital market and the financial market are perfectly competitive and clear;
- on each differentiated good market, there is Cournot competition with free entry;
- pieces of knowledge are traded using bilateral contracts.
The third objective is to derive an implementation of the optimal balanced growth
5To extend the analysis to the case in which sellers extract only a fraction of the willingnesses to pay,
one can assume that innovators know that the willingness to pay of firm qj , to use an innovation at t, vqjt,
belongs to the set
h
vqjt, vqjt
i
which is the support of a cumulative distribution function denoted by Φ ().
If sellers choose dvqjt such that dvqjt < vqjt, they get dvqjt with probability 1− Φ(dvqjt). If they choose dvqjt
such that dvqjt > vqjt, they get zero with probability Φ(dvqjt). The instantaneous expected gain of sellers
is then: dvqjt[1−Φ(dvqjt)]. Thus the price that maximizes this expression isdvqjt = [1−Φ ¡dvqjt¢]/Φ0 ¡dvqjt¢ .
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path of the model. There are two distortions at equilibrium: pollution emissions and
imperfect competition. To neutralize the effects of these distortions, two economic policy
tools are then necessary. The first one is the tax on pollution emissions, τ t, introduced
previously. By choosing an appropriate environmental policy, the government can obtain
an optimal flow of pollution. The second policy tool consists of a subsidy for the demands
of differentiated goods, σjt, j = 1, ..., N . This aims at removing the effects caused by the
competition “a la Cournot” to get optimal demands for differentiated goods.
We assume that the environmental policy and the subsidies for the demand of differ-
entiated goods are funded through a lump-sum transfer, Tt, from individuals. We suppose
that the budget constraint of the government is balanced at each moment. We now turn
to the behavior of agents.
3.1 Behavior of agents
3.1.1 Individuals
The representative individual chooses plans for consumption, cjt, wealth, Bt, and human
capital, Ht. He/she maximizes (5) subject to the law of motion of human capital (4), and
the budget constraint
•
Bt = rtBt + wt
¡
Ht −HHt
¢
−
PN
j=1(1 − σjt)pjtcjt + Tt (recall that
wt is equal to one). Since knowledge, Zt, is the only asset of the firms, the total stock of
wealth is Bt = ZtVt. The current-value Hamiltonian to this problem is:
CVH = ln[
NX
j=1
(cjt)
α]1/α + ε lnHt − ω lnEt +
λt
h
rtBt +
¡
Ht −HHt
¢
−
XN
j=1
(1− σjt)pjtcjt − Tt
i
+ ξtψH
H
t .
The first order conditions are: ∂CV H/∂cjt = 0, ∂CV H/∂HHt = 0, ∂CV H/∂Bt =
−
•
λt + λtρ, ∂CV H/∂Ht =
•
ξt + ξtρ. The transversality conditions are: limt→∞λtBte
−ρt = 0,
and lim
t→∞
ξtHte−ρt = 0. Some manipulation gives the following conditions:
(cjt)
α−1PN
j=1 (cjt)
α = λt(1− σjt)pjt, (8)
ξtψ = λt, (9)
rt +
•
λt
λt
= ρ, (10)
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ε
ξtHt
+
λt
ξt
+
•
ξt
ξt
= ρ. (11)
Using (8), one gets the aggregate demand function for each consumption good j :
cjt = Dt[(1 − σjt)pjt]1/(α−1), where Dt =
PN
k=1(1 − σkt)pktckt/
PN
k=1[(1 − σkt)pkt]α/(α−1).
Using the resource constraint, Xjt = cjt (see equation (6)), the inverse demand function
for differentiated good j is:
pjt =
(Dt)
1−α (
PQjt
qj=1Xqjt)
α−1
(1− σjt)
. (12)
Combining (8) and (10), one gets the usual Keynes-Ramsey rule:
rt = (1− α) gcjt + gΩt + gpjt + g(1−σjt) + ρ, (13)
where gΩt is the growth rate of Ωt =
PN
j=1 (cjt)
α.
Combining (8), (9), (10) and (11), one gets:
ψ +
εψ(1− σjt)pjt
PN
j=1 (cjt)
α
Ht (cjt)
α−1 = rt. (14)
Note that the first term on the left hand side of (14), ψ, can be interpreted as the
pecuniary part of the return to education. It corresponds to the productivity gain that
individuals obtain when they allocate an additional unit of human capital to educa-
tion. This allows individuals to get a higher wage income. The second term, εψ(1 −
σjt)pjt
PN
j=1 (cjt)
α /[Ht (cjt)
α−1], is the non-pecuniary part of the return to education. It
comes from the utility that individuals derive from the consumption of education. It is
equal to zero if the desire for education, ε, is zero. We will see in Section 3.3 that environ-
mental policy changes alter long-run growth through their effects on the non-pecuniary
part of the return to education, i.e. through the willingness of individuals to acquire skills.
3.1.2 Firms
Firms have two activities: 1) they produce and sell differentiated goods on an imperfect
market (competition “a la Cournot”); 2) simultaneously, they produce and sell knowledge.
Each time firm qj maximizesgπqjt = pjtXqjt−τ tpjtEqjt−HXqjt+Vt •Zqjt−HZqjt, subject to the
technologies Xqjt = AH
X
qjt (see equation (1)) and
•
Zqjt = δH
Z
qjt (Zt)
φ (see equation (2)),
the inverse demand function pjt = (Dt)
1−α (
PQjt
qj=1Xqjt)
α−1/(1− σjt) (see equation (12))
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and the flow of emissions of pollution Eqjt =
¡
Xqtj
¢
(Zt)
−β (see equation (3)). After sub-
stitutions, one has the following program: max. gπqjt = Xqjt{(Dt)1−α (PQjtqj=1Xqjt)α−1[1−
τ t (Zt)
−β]/ (1− σjt)−A−1}+ VtδHZqjt (Zt)φ −HZqjt.
The first order condition with respect to Xqjt leads to
Xjt = Dt
(
A[1− τ t (Zt)−β]
£
1 + (α− 1)Xqjt/(Xjt)
¤
(1− σjt)
) 1
1−α
. (15)
This equation implicitly yields the best response of firm qj to the choice of production of
differentiated good j of the others.
The first order condition with respect to HZqjt yields:
Vtδ (Zt)
φ = 1. (16)
The willingness to pay at time t to use a piece of knowledge at t is:
vqjt = ∂gπqjt/∂Zt = βτ t (Dt)1−α (Xjt)α−1Xqjt(Zt)−β−1/ (1− σjt) + VtφδHZqjt (Zt)φ−1 . (17)
The term vqjt is composed of two parts. The first one, βτ t(Dt)
1−α (Xjt)α−1 Xqjt (Zt)
−β−1
/(1 − σjt), is the willingness to pay to use a piece of knowledge at time t to reduce
pollution emissions. The second one, VtφδHZqjt (Zt)
φ−1 , is the willingness to pay to use a
piece of knowledge at time t to make research. We recover, here, the public good nature
of knowledge inside the firm: each unit of knowledge is used twice by each firm.
The free entry condition on the market of the differentiated good implies
πqjt =gπqjt − Vqjt •Zt = 0,∀qj,∀j, (18)
where Vqjt
•
Zt represents the payment of knowledge of firm qj.
3.2 Symmetric equilibrium and characterization of the steady-
state
We now focus on a symmetric equilibrium at steady-state, i.e. on paths along which
the growth rate of any variable, the shares of human capital denoted respectively by
lX ≡ HXt /Ht, lZ ≡ HZt /Ht, lH ≡ HHt /Ht, and the number of firms in each sector, Q, are
constant.
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Definition 2 A symmetric equilibrium is characterized by a number of firms in each
sector j, quantities, prices and rates of subsidy for the demands of differentiated goods
that are identical for all qj and for all j: Qj = Q for all j, Xqjt = Xj/Q = Xt/Q,
lXqj = l
X
j /Q = lX/ (NQ) , lZqj = l
Z
j /Q = lZ/ (NQ) , Zqjt = Zjt/Q = Zt/ (NQ) , Eqjt =
Ejt/Q = Et/(NQ), for all qj and for all j; pjt = pt, vqjt = vjt/Q = vt/ (NQ) , Vqjt =
Vjt/Q = Vt/ (NQ) for all qj and for all j, σjt = σt for all j.
Proposition 1 summarizes the results we get. The proof of this Proposition shows that
the existence of a steady-state equilibrium requires that the term τ t (Zt)
−β is constant
over-time. Thus, we assume that the government chooses a growth path for the tax on
pollution such that gτ = βgZ at any moment. This implies that τ t (Zt)
−β ≡ τ 0 (Z0)−β for
all t, where τ 0 and Z0 denote respectively the initial values of τ t and Zt. Furthermore, the
rate of subsidy for the demand of differentiated goods is constant at any moment: σt = σ
for all t.
Proposition 1 At steady-state, the symmetric dynamic general equilibrium with Cournot
competition and free entry is characterized by a set of quantities, prices, growth rates and
a number of firms in each sector that take the following values:
Quantities:
lH =
εψ(1− σ) + (ψ − ρ)[1− τ 0 (Z0)−β]
ψ[1− τ 0 (Z0)−β] + εψ(1− σ)
,
lZ =
βρτ 0 (Z0)
−β lH
(1− φ)
n
ψ[1− τ 0 (Z0)−β] + ε(1− σ) (ψ + ρ)
o ,
lX = 1− lH − lZ ,
ct = Xt =
AlXHt
N
, Et = NXt(Zt)−β, Zt = Z0 exp{gZt}, Ht = H0 exp{gHt}.
Growth rates of quantities:
gH = gHX = gHZ = gHH = ψlH , gc = gX = gH , gZ =
gH
1− φ gE = gH
µ
1− β
1− φ
¶
.
Prices:
p =
1
A[1− τ 0 (Z0)−β][1 + (α− 1)/Q]
,
vt =
βτ 0 (Z0)
−β lX
[1− τ 0 (Z0)−β][1 + (α− 1)/Q]
Ht
Zt
+
φgZ
δ (Zt)
φ ,
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Vt =
1
δ (Zt)
φ ,
r = gc + ρ.
Growth rates of prices:
gp = gr = 0, gv = gV = −φgZ .
Number of firms in each sector:
Q =
(1− α)(1− lH)
lZ
.
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 1, shows that a positive growth of consumption per-capita is compatible
with a cleaner environment. One has gc > 0 and gE < 0 if 1 − β/(1 − φ) < 0. If the
government does not intervene, i.e. τ 0 = 0, firms do not employ any human capital
to conduct research: lZ = 0, so no research is conducted to attempt to reduce pollution
emissions. The reason is simply that firms do not have incentives to spend funds in a costly
activity which is not profitable. In this case, the positive growth rate of consumption goes
along with a more polluted environment: gE > 0.
In this economy, human capital accumulation is the ultimate engine of growth. The
main interesting result is the possibility for the government to modify the long-run value
of growth through a change of environmental policy. Proposition 1 shows that the equilib-
rium value of the share of human capital devoted to education, lH , depends on τ 0. Thus, a
change in the level of the environmental policy induces individuals to modify their choice
of education. In turn, this affects the long-run level of growth of consumption per-capita
because gc = gH = ψlH .6 We study the effects of environmental policy changes on the
steady-state in the next sub-section.
3.3 Effects of environmental policy changes
We assume that the economy has reached the balanced growth path, and the government
decides to implement a permanent, marginal increase in τ 0. The effect on the variables
are summarized in Table 1 which presents the signs of the derivatives of lH , lZ , lX , p, r, Q,
6In a R&D-based model with endogenous population growth, Jones (2003) describes a similar mech-
anism. He shows that a subsidy to research affects growth through their effects on the choice of fertility
of individuals.
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gc with respect to the policy instrument τ 0. The proofs of the results are direct when we
examine Proposition 1.
Table 1
About here
From Table 1, an increase of the tax on pollution, τ 0, leads to an increase of the share
of human capital devoted to R&D, lZ , a decrease of the share of human capital devoted to
the production of differentiated goods, lX , a higher price for differentiated goods, p, and
a reduction of the number of firms in each sector, Q. The effect on the share of human
capital devoted to education, lH , so on the long-run growth rate of consumption, gc, and
on the interest rate, r, depends on the desire of individuals to acquire education, ε. The
intuition for these results is as follows.
When the policy-maker increases the level of the policy instrument, firms have an
incentive to reduce their pollution emissions. Then, they employ more human capital
for research activities, and reduce the quantity they employ for the production of the
goods: lZ is higher and lX is lower. The primary effect is an improvement of the price of
differentiated goods, p, and a diminution of the number of firms in each sector, Q.
To understand the effect of policy changes on the decisions of individuals to acquire
skills on the growth rate of consumption and on the interest rate, it is convenient to recall
equation (14): ψ + εψ(1 − σjt)pjt
PN
j=1 (cjt)
α / [Ht (cjt)
α−1] = r. Using Proposition 1,
this equation shows that policy changes affect the non-pecuniary part of the return to
education (second term on the left hand side), i.e. the utility gains obtained from the
consumption of education. Therefore, when ε > 0, the willingness of individuals to acquire
skills is altered. Basically, individuals face a higher price for differentiated goods. So, they
prefer to ‘consume’ more education because the cost of education relative to consumption
is lower. They allocate a larger share of their time to educational activities, lH . This
drives the interest rate, r, and the growth rates of human capital, gH , and consumption,
gc, up.
When ε = 0, education does not affect the level of utility of individuals. The return
to investment in education is constant and independent of the policy instrument: ψ = r.
Thus, the decision of individuals to acquire skills are not altered by policy changes. The
steady-state growth rate of human capital obtained is the same as in Lucas (1988). The
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more effective education is, i.e. the larger ψ is, the higher are gH , gZ, gc. However,
as before, the policy change induces firms to reduce the amount of human capital they
use to produce the differentiated goods and to employ more human capital to produce
knowledge. This leads to an increase of the market price for differentiated goods and
to a reduction of the number of firms operating in each sector. In the meantime, the
environment is cleaner.
3.4 Implementation of optimum
Before to compute the exact values of the policy tools which allow the government to
maximize welfare, it is necessary to characterize the optimal balanced growth path. The
problem of the social planner is to maximize (5) subject to (1), (2), (3), (4), (6), (7). In
this problem, the number of firms in each sector, Q, is taken as given. The results are
summarized in Proposition 2.
Proposition 2 An optimal balanced growth path is characterized by a set of shares of
human that satisfy the following system of three equations:
lX + lZ + lH = 1, (19)
βωlXψlH
(1− ω)(1− φ)lZ = ψl
H + ρ, (20)
εψlX
(1− ω) + ψ = ψl
H + ρ. (21)
Quantities are:
ct = Xt =
AlXHt
N
, Et = NXt(Zt)−β, Zt = Z0 exp{gZt}, Ht = H0 exp{gHt}.
Growth rates are:
gH = ψlH , gc = gX = gH , gZ =
gH
1− φ gE = gH
µ
1− β
1− φ
¶
.
Proof. See Appendix.
Now, we can compute the levels of the policy tools that allow the government to
implement the optimum. Comparing the results at equilibrium (Proposition 1) and at
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optimum (Proposition 2), the value of the optimal environmental tax rate comes easily.7
Moreover, the subsidy for the demand of differentiated goods is such that the price ef-
fectively paid by individuals to consume a unit of differentiated good equals its marginal
cost of production: (1− σ)p = A−1 + pτ t (Zt)−β . To sum-up, one has:
Proposition 3 If the government chooses
τ 0 = ω (Z0)
β ,
σ =
(1− α)(1− ω)
Q
,
the balanced growth path at equilibrium is optimal.
From Proposition 3, when the policy-maker chooses the value of the subsidy rate,
σ, he/she implicitly determines the number of firms operating on the market of each
differentiated good. Given the fact that the environmental tax, τ 0, is optimal, the subsidy
rate, σ, is set such that the values of the shares of human capital at equilibrium match
the ones computed for the optimum (Proposition 2).
One should make observe that, if individuals do not derive utility from education,
ε = 0, one single policy instrument consisting of the environmental tax, τ 0 = ω (Z0)
β , is
sufficient to maximize welfare. Indeed, examination of Proposition 1, shows that, in this
particular case, the rate of subsidy σ does not appear in quantities, prices and growth rates
at the steady-state. We impose this subsidy in order to eliminate the distortion caused
by imperfect competition. However, this policy tool does not modify the equilibrium
values. There are two reasons for this result. First, in this case the supply of human
capital to working activities (production of differentiated goods and research) is inelastic
with respect to the rate of subsidy σ. Second, the Cournot competition leads to a price
for differentiated goods which is above the marginal cost of production. However, the
relative prices of differentiated goods are not affected by imperfect competition because
of the property of symmetry of the model. Consequently, imperfect competition, alone,
does not prevent optimality.8 The only distortion affecting the allocation of human capital
consists of pollution externalities. The role of the environmental tax, τ 0 = ω (Z0)
β , is then
7More precisely, to obtain Proposition 3, we compare equations (20) and (21) with the equivalent ones
of the equilibrium which are computed in Appendix (see equations (32) and (33), respectively).
8See Barro and Sala-I-Martin (1995, ch. 6, Section 2) who obtain a similar result in a model with an
expanding variety of consumer products, but without pollution.
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to obtain an optimal allocation of the shares of human capital inside working activities,
lX and lZ .
4 Conclusion
This paper has investigated the implication for growth of an environmental policy. We
have shown that a tighter policy can enhance growth. This is because the policy acts
through the channel of education which is the only ingredient to sustain long-run economic
growth. The result comes from the fact that we have treated education as a product
altering the utility of individuals. This renders the supply of human capital to working
activities elastic with respect to price changes, i.e. to policy changes. To conduct the
analysis, we have considered an equilibrium in which knowledge is directly patented and
priced. We have characterized a general equilibrium with Cournot competition and free
entry. We have then derived an implementation of the optimal balanced growth path
and computed the values of the policy tools that a policy-maker should use to maximize
welfare.
Beyond the question treated in this paper, we think that there are some avenues for
future research. For instance, one could study the transitional dynamics of the model.
Several other extensions are also possible. We think that an interesting one would be to
introduce a nonrenewable resource in the model: it is well known that the combustion of
resources such as petroleum or coal is responsible for an important part of CO2 and the
main greenhouse gas.
5 Appendix
5.1 Equilibrium with Cournot competition and free entry
We proceed in two steps. First, we compute the main conditions that emerge at date t
on each market. Second, we characterize the steady-state equilibrium.
1) Markets conditions for a symmetric equilibrium
On differentiated goods markets there is Cournot competition and free entry in each
sector j. Using (15), one gets the equilibrium quantity of each differentiated good which
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is produced in each sector:
Xt = Dt
(
A[1− τ t (Zt)−β] [1 + (α− 1)/Qt]
(1− σt)
) 1
1−α
. (22)
Using (1), one gets the aggregate production function for each differentiated good:
Xt =
AHXt
N
. (23)
Using (3), the total flow of pollution emissions is:
Et = NXt (Zt)
−β . (24)
Equations (12) and (22) yield the Cournot equilibrium price for each differentiated good
j :
pt =
1
A[1− τ t (Zt)−β] [1 + (α− 1)/Qt]
. (25)
From (18), the free entry condition is πqjt = gπqjt − Vqjt •Zt = 0 for all qj and for all j.
Using the property of symmetry, one has πqjt = πt = ptXt[1− τ t (Zt)
−β]/Qt−HXt /QtN −
HZt /QtN = 0 for all qj and for all j. Plugging equations (23) and (25), one gets
HXt
[1 + (α− 1)/Qt]
−HXt −HZt = 0. (26)
Knowledge is traded using bilateral contracts. From (17), (22), (23), one gets the total
willingness to pay at date t to use a piece of knowledge at t by all firms of the N sectors:
vt =
NX
j=1
QjtX
qj=1
vqjt =
βτ t (Zt)
−βHXt
[1− τ t (Zt)−β] [1 + (α− 1)/Qt]Zt
+ VtφδHZt (Zt)
φ−1 . (27)
Equation (16) gives the willingness to pay to use a piece of knowledge from t to infinity
by all firms of the N sectors:
Vt =
Z ∞
t
vse−
? s
t rududs =
1
δ (Zt)
φ , (28)
From (2), the aggregate law of motion of knowledge is
•
Zt = δHZt (Zt)
φ , (29)
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which yields gZt = δHZt (Zt)
φ−1 for all t.
The financial market is perfectly competitive. Using equation (13) with the assumption
of symmetry, on gets the value of the interest rate:
rt = gct + ρ+ gpt + g(1−σt) = vt/Vt + gVt. (30)
Finally, the labor market is perfectly competitive and clears. At each instant, one has
Ht = HXt +HZt +HHt , which yields
1 = lXt + l
Z
t + l
H
t , (31)
when we divide by Ht.
2) Steady-State
Recall that σ is independent of t. Thus, g(1−σ) is equal to zero.
Prices:
The prices and their growth rates follow directly from (25), (27), (28), (30).
Levels of quantities and their growth rates:
The quantities are given by (4), (22), (23), (24), (29). Their growth rates are easily com-
puted by differentiation. Moreover, equation (4) implies that gH = ψlH at each moment
since lH ≡ HHt /Ht.
Using rt =
•
Vt/Vt + vt/Vt with lXt ≡ HXt /Ht, lZt ≡ HZt /Ht, (27), (28), (29), (30) and the
value of the growth rates obtained above, one gets
ψlH + ρ =
βgZτ t (Zt)
−β
[1− τ t (Zt)−β][1 + (α− 1)/Q]
lX
lZ
. (32)
Applying the property of symmetry to equation (14) and using lX ≡ HXt /Ht (23), (25),
(30) with the value of the growth rates obtained above, one gets
ψlH + ρ = ψ +
εψ (1− σ) lX
[1− τ t (Zt)−β] [1 + (α− 1)/Q]
. (33)
Number of firms, Q, that composes each sector j:
Dividing the free entry condition in each sector (26) by Ht, one gets
lX
[1 + (α− 1)/Q] = l
X + lZ . (34)
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Equations (31), (32), (33), (34) constitute a system of four equations with four un-
knowns (lX , lZ , lH , Q) that can be used to determine the values given in Proposition
1. To find lH , we combine (32) and (34) and use the fact that lX + lZ = 1 − lH
(see (31)). To find lZ , we equate the right hand side of (32) and (33) and, as be-
fore, we replace lX/[1 + (α − 1)/Q] by 1 − lH (see (31)). Using the value of lH , one
computes 1 − lH = ρ[1 − τ 0 (Z0)−β]/{ψ[1 − τ 0 (Z0)−β] + εψ(1 − σ)}. Thus, one finds
lZ = βρτ 0 (Z0)
−β gZ/
n
ψ2[1− τ 0 (Z0)−β] + εψ(1− σ)(ψ + ρ)
o
. Replacing gZ by its value
computed previously (gZ = ψlH/(1− φ)), one gets the value of lZ given in Proposition 1.
This value is given as a function of lH for convenience. Finally, the values of lX and Q
follow directly from (31) and 34.
Note that equations (32) and (33) require that the term τ t (Zt)
−β is constant, i.e. we
must have τ t (Zt)
−β ≡ τ 0 (Z0)−β at any time at steady-state.
5.2 Optimum
At optimum, the number of firms in each sector, Qj, is given. The problem of the social
planner is to maximize (5) subject to the aggregate production process of differentiated
good j (Xjt =
PQj
qj=1Xqjt = AH
X
jt ), the aggregate production process of knowledge (
•
Zt =PN
j=1
PQj
qj=1
•
Zqjt = δHZt (Zt)
φ), the flow of pollution emissions (Et =
PN
j=1
PQj
qj=1Eqjt =PN
j=1Xjt (Zt)
−β) and the human capital constraint (7). The current value Hamiltonian
of the problem is
CVH = ln[
NX
j=1
(cjt)
α]1/α + ε lnHt − ω ln
NX
j=1
AHXjt (Zt)
−β +
NX
j=1
λjt
£
AHXjt − cjt
¤
+
μtφδH
Z
t (Zt)
φ + νtψHHt + ξt
"
Ht −
NX
j=1
HXjt −HAt −HtH
#
,
where λjt (j = 1, ..., N), μt, νt are co-state variables.
The first order conditions are: ∂CV H/∂cjt = 0, ∂CV H/∂HXjt = 0, ∂CV H/∂HZt = 0,
∂CV H/∂HHt = 0, ∂CV H/∂Zt = −
•
μt+ρμt, ∂CV H/∂Ht = −
•
νt+ρνt. The transversality
conditions are lim
t→∞
μtZte−ρt = 0 and limt→∞νtHte
−ρt = 0.We look for a symmetric optimum:
λjt = λt for all j.The first order conditions are: 1/ct = λtN (a),−ω/HXt +λtNXt/HXt = ξt
(b), μt
•
Zt/HZt = ξt (c), νtψ = ξt (d), βω/Zt + μtφ
•
Zt/Zt = −
•
μt + ρμt (e), ε/Ht + ξt =
− •νt + ρνt (f). The transversality conditions are lim
t→∞
μtZte−ρt = 0 and limt→∞νtHte
−ρt = 0.
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The growth rates are gH = ψlH , gc = gX = gH , gZ = gH/(1−φ), gE = gH [1− β/(1−
φ)].
Let us divide (e) by μt and (f) by νt. One gets βω/μtZt + φgZ = −
•
μt/μt + ρ (e’)
and ε/νtHt + ξt/νt = −
•
νt/νt + ρ (f’). Manipulation of (a) and (b) with the condition
ct = Xt yields 1/(ξtHt) = HXt /[(1 − ω)Ht] (g). Manipulation of (c), (d) and (g) yields
1/μtZt = gZHXt /[(1−ω)HZt ] (h). Thus, from (a), (e’), (f’), (g), (h), one deduces −gλ = gc,
−gμ = gZ , −gν = −gξ = gH (i). Manipulation of (c), (e’), (h), (i) yields
βωlXψlH
(1− ω)(1− φ)lZ = ψl
H + ρ.
Manipulation of (d), (e’), (f), (h) yields
εψlX
(1− ω) + ψ = ψl
H + ρ.
The two previous equations and the human capital constraint can be used to determine
the shares of human capital devoted to each sector of the economy.
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